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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a functionalist interpretation 
of the assessment of art. In the following chapters I will explore the 
idea that we can assess the value of art works in terms of the various 
functions that they serve. Rejecting the idea that the value of art 
works lies in some kind of metaphysical value, I suggest that art 
works are valuable because we value them. We value them, I argue, on 
account of the various artistic functions that they perform. The 
purpose of chapter one is to set the scene philosophically, by 
explaining in greater detail what is involved in a functionalist 
interpretation of the assessment of art. In this chapter I suggest that 
the primary objections to my framework of assessment derive from 
the idea that only aesthetic considerations are relevant to 
assessment. In response I argue that this idea, which is central to 
both modernism. aestheticism and formalism. is based upon an 
unacceptably narrow conception of the nature and purpose of art. 
and should be rejected. In chapters two to six, I discuss in detail five 
of the more important non-aesthetic functions of art. providing 
examples which help to illustrate their contribution to the value of 
art works. Together these functions help to show that the idea that 
only aesthetic considerations are relevant to the assessment of art is 
unacceptably restrictive. 
Chapter two is a discussion of the idea that a central function of 
art is to represent the objects of reality. I argue that the concept of 
representation as ordinarily construed has serious difficulties_, and is 
based upon assumptions which we are better off abandoning. I 
suggest that it would be better to conceive of art as a vehicle in 
which we can present ideas, depictions, and conceptualizations of 
various aspects of our understanding and experience. Such 
'presentations', I argue, can be valued for the way in which they 
provide insights into different aspects of the world, and thus 
contribute to our understanding. In chapter three, I show that an 
important dimension of the value of art can be the way in which art 
works function to express cultural and spiritual beliefs and values. In 
chapter four, I discuss the way in which art can function to act as a 
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vehicle for the expression of social and political ideas. In chapter 
five, I show how the moral significance of an art work can contribute 
importantly to its value, and in chapter six, I discuss the relevance of 
the expression and arousal of emotion to the value of art works. In 
chapter seven, I return to discuss the importance of aesthetic 
considerations to the assessment of art. I suggest that although it 
would be difficult to sustain the argument that aesthetic merit is a 
necessary component of artistic value, it is nevertheless true that 
aesthetic considerations play a particularly important role in the 
assessment of art works. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. John Patterson, for his 
advice and encouragement. 
lV 
Acknowledgements 
List of plates 
CONTENTS 
1. Function and Assessment: An Introduction 
2. Representation and Reality 
3. The Cultural Function of Art 
4. Art and Society 
5. Art and the Moral Life 
6. Art and Emotion 
7. The Aesthetic Dimension of Art 
Conclusion 
iv 
vi 
1 
18 
35 
48 
64 
81 
95 
112 
Plates 
Bibliography 
Between pp. 118 and 119 
119 
V 
LIST OF PLATES 
1. Manjuwi. Wulumumu, Morning Star Story. 1981. Ochre on bark. 
157.5 x 70.7cm. 
2. Curly Bardagubu. Yingama. 1980. Ochre on bark. 183.5 x 87.7cm. 
Vl 
3. Colin McCahon. Gate: White Diamond (Gate series 1). 1961. Solpah 
on board, 122 x 81cm. 
4. Colin McCahon. The Second Gate Series. Panels 1 and 2. Monocoat 
on board, height 122cm. 
5. Colin McCahon. The Second Gate Series. Panels 3. 4, and 5. 
Monocoat on board, height 122cm. 
6. Nigel Brown. Dominion Bitter. 1977. Oil on board, 118 x 70cm. 
7. Nigel Brown. The Man is Stronger than the Land. 1977. Oil on 
board, 122 x 162cm. 
8. Nigel Brown. Boycott French Goods. 1984. Poster. 
9. Nigel Brown. The Need to Belong, The Need to Stand Alone. 1991. 
Oil on board, 120 x 240cm. 
10. Unknown. Pieta. Early 14th century. Wood, height 85cm. 
CHAPTER ONE 
Function and Assessment: 
An Introduction 
It is the purpose of this thesis to develop an interpretation of art and 
its assessment in terms of the various functions which we can 
identify art works to be serving. In this introductory section I wish to 
explain what is involved in the idea that we can assess works of art in 
terms of the various functions or ends which they serve. Art works 
serve numerous different functions, and have the potential to be 
evaluated in a multitude of different ways. For the purpose of 
formulating a workable framework of evaluation, I have classified 
what I see to be six particularly important functions of art. It is 
important at this stage to stress that the classification presented 
does not purport to be the last word, or even a fully comprehensive 
account, of the various functions served by works of art qua works of 
art. There is no doubt that many other functions could be added to 
such a classification. My purpose is rather to show that art works do 
perform a variety of significant functions, and that if we are to assess 
the full potential of a work of art, it is often necessary to take a 
variety of these functions into consideration. It should be noted that 
the focus of this thesis is not just upon the visual arts, but upon the 
arts in general. I shall thus be drawing upon examples from music, 
from painting, from poetry, from fiction, and from sculpture. 
The functions which I have identified as being central to our 
understanding of art and its purpose are as follows: 
1) Art can function to 'represent' the world around us. By 
presenting reflections and conceptualizations of various aspects 
of the world, art can alert us to new ways of seeing the familiar, 
and in doing so contribute to our understanding. 
2) Art can function to reflect and promote the cultural and 
religious beliefs and values that are central to the world-view 
and identity of different groups of people. 
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3) Art can function to reflect and comment upon the social and 
political conditions of society. Art can convey social and 
political ideas, and criticize existing norms and practises. In 
this capacity, art often assumes a subversive role. 
4) Art can act as a vehicle for the portrayal of morally significant 
situations and concerns. In doing so, art can encourage a 
greater understanding of morality, and perhaps even influence 
our behaviour as moral beings. 
5) Art can be a medium for the expression and arousal of 
emotional feeling and depth. 
6) Art can function to provide specifically aesthetic experience 
and contemplation. That is, art can be the object of 
appreciation when we look to the surface (formal) aspects 
alone. 
As I have indicated, this classification is by no means final, and does 
not pretend to provide an exhaustive account of the possible 
functions of art. It is rather an attempt to give some kind of workable 
classification and order to several of the more significant functions 
served by works of art, especially as these functions may relate to a 
framework of assessment. 
At this stage it will be useful to say something more about how a 
functionalist interpretation of art will fit into a theory of assessment. 
It must first be stated that I do not intend to provide a narrowly 
normative functionalist interpretation of assessment, according to 
which all art works must fulfil one or even a specific set of functions 
before they can be regarded as good art works (or even as works of 
art at all). 1 Thus I do not wish to claim that there is a single function 
or rigid set of functions which all art works must or should perform. 
I wish instead to develop a more flexible and pluralistic 
1. The normative functionalist will argue that there is a certain function (or group of 
functions) which all art works ought to serve. Only if an artwork serves this function 
(or group of functions) can a favourable assessment be given. Reciprocally, when an 
art work fails to seive its designated function, it is considered a failure as a work of 
art. (Novttz in A Companion to Aesthetics, p. 163) 
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interpretation of art and its assessment, according to which there 
are a number of significant functions which can be exhibited by 
works of art, any one of which may contribute importantly to the 
value of a work of art. 
Although I have referred to the various aspects on account of 
which artistic merit may be awarded as the different functions of art, 
it would be possible to construe these functions alternatively as the 
different strengths or facets or areas of excellence of art. The 
purpose of the assessment of art, as we shall see, is to take an 
individual work of art and focus upon the various ways in which that 
work can stimulate and provoke contemplation and enjoyment. 2 We 
want to say that 'these are its strengths', or 'these are its areas of 
excellence'. 'In virtue of its excellence in performing this function, 
or these particular functions, this is a good work of art'. 
The functions of art discussed in the following chapters are also 
closely related to the various roles which art works can play in our 
lives. As we shall see, art intersects with our lives in many significant 
and important ways. 
While there is no single function which a work of art must fulfil 
in order to be a good work of art, it seems reasonable to hold that an 
art work would have to fulfil some of the functions which are 
considered in a particular society to be central to the nature and 
purpose of art if it is to be awarded a favourable assessment. 3 It may 
not be necessary to specify exactly which ones, but it seems plausible 
to claim that a work would have to excel in at least one or two of the 
'functions of art' if it were to be considered a good work of art. 
Indeed, if an 'art work' fails to perform any of the functions which we 
2. 'Contemplation' in this context does not ref er exclusively to the contemplation 
provoked by · the intellectual dimension of art. Works of art may also stimulate 
aesthetic and emotional contemplation, as will be demonstrated in subsequent 
chapters. 
3. As we will see in chapter seven, although there are no artistic functions which we 
can rightly consider to be necessary to the value of art, it is nevertheless the case that 
one particular function is particularly important. As I will argue in chapter seven, the 
capacity to provoke a degree of aesthetic satisfaction is of particular importance to 
the value of a work of art. 
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hold to be central to our conception of art, we will hardly be able to 
call it a work of art at all. A functionalist account of assessment thus 
goes hand in hand with a functionalist account of the definition of art. 
In order for an entity to be included in the class of art works at all, it 
must exhibit (with at least a minimal degree of merit) at least some 
of the functions which we generally associate with art. For if it did 
not, it is doubtful that we would have any way of recognizing its 
artistic merit, or even its status as an art work, at all. 
Objections to Functionalism in Evaluation 
The most significant attacks against the idea that art works should be 
evaluated in terms of the various functions that they serve derive 
from the nineteenth century movement known as 'art for art's sake', 
or 'aestheticism'. They are based upon the idea that functionalism 
with respect to evaluation poses a threat to the aesthetic autonomy of 
art. In this section I wish to show that although it is possible to 
identify two distinct objections which have been levelled against 
various interpretations of functionalism, (each involving a different 
sense of 'autonomy'). neither of these objections need be considered 
a serious threat to the functionalist framework presented in this 
thesis. 
1. The flrst objection from autonomy 
The first objection 'from autonomy' is based upon a characteristic 
presupposition of art for art's sake, which is the belief that the 
institution of art is autonomous in the sense that artists are under no 
obligation to cater to the social, moral, political, religious, or 
economic demands of society. 4 This stance was adopted by 
proponents of the art for art's sake movement in part 'as a reaction 
to the utilitarian and materialistic values of the new industrial age' 
4. See Goran Hermeren, ''The Autonomy of Art", for a discussion of the various senses 
in which a work of art may be thought to be autonomous. 
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(Whewell, p. 6).5 Three of the central advocates of this view were 
Oscar Wilde and Walter Pater in England, and Theophile Gautier in 
France. 
Although the idea that the institution of art is fully autonomous 
in the sense that artists are under no obligation to invest their works 
with any social, moral, emotional, or didactic purpose may be 
incompatible with the kind of utilitarian conceptions of art against 
which art for art's sake reacted, it is not incompatible with the 
functionalist framework presented in this thesis. Indeed, one of the 
most significant features of my framework of evaluation is that it does 
respect the autonomy of the artist to produce works which serve no 
purpose but to provide aesthetic stimulation. In other words, the 
framework of assessment presented in this thesis does not attach 
any normative value to the various non-aesthetic functions of art. 6 
Although I acknowledge that works of art can perform certain non-
aesthetic functions, and that the performance of these functions can 
contribute importantly to the value of an art work, I do not hold that 
it is necessary for a work to perform any of these functions before it 
can be considered either to be a work of art or a good work of art. In 
terms of my framework of evaluation, the purpose of articulating the 
various functions of art is rather to describe the various things that 
art can be, and to identify the various areas in which a work of art 
can provide stimulation and interest. The purpose of a functionalist 
interpretation of art is to elucidate the various perspectives from 
which a work of art may be appreciated. It is not, however, the 
purpose of a functionalist theory to specify the various functions 
which a work of art ought to perform. 
5. The idea that art works ought to serve certain functions was not confined to this 
period alone. however. Throughout the middle ages. for example. it was expected that 
art works ought serve an explicitly religious function. According to Tolstoy, art ought 
to be an instrument of moral instruction. and according to Marx. art ought to serve 
specific social ends. 
6. In this thesis I refer to the functions described in chapters two to six as the 'non-
aesthetic' functions of art. They are referred to as non-aesthetic because they would 
all be excluded from the purely formal aesthetic dimension of art. which the 
formalist holds to be the only relevant dimension of an art work. (Incorrectly. I 
believe.) 
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2. The second objection from autonomy. 
The second objection from autonomy, also based upon a central tenet 
of aestheticism, involves a different sense of the 'autonomy' of art. 
This sense involves the belief that what is of central importance 
about art is its ability to provide an experience which is peculiarly 
aesthetic. Proponents of aestheticism hold that it is the aesthetic 
quality of art which gives it its special identity and autonomy, and 
which marks off art as constitutive of an independent and 
autonomous domain. They believe that in making an assessment of an 
art work's worth we should focus exclusively on the aesthetic 
(formal) qualities of that work, and purposely disregard any non-
aesthetic functions which that work may happen to serve. A 
necessary condition of valuing a work of art 'for its own sake', 
according to the aesthete, is that it be valued on account of its 
intrinsic (aesthetic) properties, and not on account of anything 
external, such as moral or political systems, or emotional impact. 
Perhaps the most extreme advocate of this position was Gautier. who 
argued in the preface to his novel Mademoiselle de Maupin that 
'nothing is truly beautiful except that which can serve for nothing; 
whichever is useful is ugly'. The aesthete would like to believe that it 
is never necessary to draw upon anything from outside a work of art 
to appreciate it. All that is relevant to the interpretation and the 
appreciation of art is right before us in the formal features of the 
work itself. Roger Scruton describes what it is to view something as 
an 'aesthetic object' in Art and Imagination, as follows: 
In viewing something aesthetically, it is said, I am viewing 
it as it is in itself, divorced from any practical interest, and 
from all comparison with other things. I see the object as 
an isolated, unique occurrence, and to the extent that I 
appreciate it aesthetically I neither bring it under concepts 
nor relate it to any practical end. (Scruton, 1974, p. 15) 
The second objecticn is based upon the belief that it is only 
aesthetic features which are relevant to an assessment of the value of 
a work of art. According to the objection, any non-aesthetic functions 
which an art work may serve are irrelevant, and to focus on them 
would be to overshadow the importance of the autonomous 
(aesthetic) quality of art. Functionalist interpretations of art are seen 
by the aesthete to usurp the autonomy of art, by attempting to 
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provide a heteronomous interpretation, in tenns of the various non-
aesthetic functions which works of art may serve. Advocates of 
aestheticism insist that art works stand aloof from any attempt to 
provide an interpretation in terms of the various non-aesthetic 
functions which art works provide for human beings. The parameters 
of interpretation, according to the aesthete, are fixed by the formal 
features of the work of art. Any moral, social, intellectual, emotional, 
or other non-aesthetic feature must thus be discarded as irrelevant. 
In response to the second objection from autonomy I wish first 
to point out that the idea that aesthetic considerations are of central 
importance to the evaluation of an art work is not at all incompatible 
with my functionalist account of the assessment of art. Indeed, I have 
already stated that it is an important function of art to communicate 
at this peculiarly aesthetic level. As I will argue in the chapter seven, 
one of the most important dimensions of the value of art is the 
capacity of art to provide aesthetic stimulation when we concentrate 
upon the formal aspects alone. It is thus certainly not my purpose 
here to dispute the importance of the 'aesthetic' in an account of 
evaluation. 
What I do wish to dispute, however, is the claim that formal 
considerations are the only significant or allowable considerations in 
the assessment of a work of art. As I will argue in the following 
chapters, there are a number of important non-aesthetic functions of 
art which do play an important role in our appreciation of art works, 
and thus that are relevant to our assessment of the value of a work of 
art. As will be made clear by the various 'non-aesthetic' artistic 
functions which are discussed and demonstrated in chapters two to 
six, the second objection from autonomy must fail because it is based 
upon an unnecessarily narrow conception of what art can be. 
Providing aesthetic stimulation is but one of the functions on account 
of which we value works of art. 
The doctrine of aestheticism represents an unacceptable 
puritanism with respect to the appreciation of art. In restricting its 
focus to a purely formal interpretation, aestheticism fails to 
acknowledge the potential of art to function in many other important 
ways. In its attempt to persuade us to look exclusively to the surface 
features of a work of art, aestheticism encourages an unnecessarily 
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two-dimensional view of art. I wish to show that such an 
interpretation is inadequate, and that there are many different 
legitimate perspectives from which we can access the value of art. 
To use as an illustration one of J.L. Austin's insights into the 
nature of language, there is a similarity between an assessment of art 
that focuses exclusively on the formal features of art works, and an 
assessment of language which focuses exclusively upon the accuracy 
with which sentences describes states of affairs. As Austin points out 
in How to Do Things with Words, the straightforward description of 
states of affairs is but one function of sentences. Sentences have 
many functions besides description. They can be used to question, to 
frighten, to emphasize, to impress, to make a promise, and so on. To 
think that words function simply to describe or simply to refer would 
clearly be to have one's focus unnecessarily restricted upon but one 
of the many important functions of words. In a similar way, to think - · 
that the function of art is simply to provide aesthetic stimulation 
would be to take an unnecessarily narrow view of the nature and 
purpose of art. As I demonstrate in the following chapters, works of 
art perform a number of non-aesthetic functions which contribute in 
important ways to their value as works of art. If we are to exploit the 
full potential of art, we must get beyond the idea that art works serve 
only to stimulate the senses. 
Having criticized the idea central to aestheticism that we ought 
to assess art works exclusively in terms of aesthetic merit, I wish 
now to question the related idea that we could ever really assess an 
art work 'in itself, or 'on its own terms'. The insistence that we must 
respond to the art work itself seems to be to suggest that any 
attempt to bring non-aesthetic aspects of art into evaluation is to give 
an unacceptably instrumentalist and heteronomous interpretation of 
the art work. In response to such a claim by the aesthete, I would say 
that surely any system of interpretation involves heteronomous 
elements, reflecting human values, preferences, and assumptions. 
Even when we respond exclusively to the aesthetic qualities of art, 
we are assessing our own reaction to certain patterns of sound and 
light. It is surely a mistake to think that we could ever respond to a 
work of art 'in itself. Art is made by and for people, so it is hardly 
surprising that we should respond to art in terms of the various 
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functions which we perceive it to be performing. The idea that an art 
work should exist entirely for itself, in an 'aesthetic vacuum', is 
bizarre to say the least. 
Art and Interpretation 
In the preceding section I argued that it is a mistake to assume, as 
the aesthete assumes, that there is only one correct way to look at 
art. As I have explained, there are many ways or perspectives from 
which we can legitimately look at art. What I wish to argue briefly in 
this section, is that it would be a further mistake to assume that 
there can only ever be one correct assessment or interpretation of an 
art work. The legacy of simplistic objectivist theories about art has 
left us with the mistaken notion that there must be some unique 
correct authoritative judgement of an art work, which once intuited, 
ought to command the agreement of all parties engaged with the 
work. It is possible that such a notion arises partly from the 
expectation that judgements about art will be subject to an 
interpretation in terms of the same kind of black and white bivalent 
logic which straightforward descriptive sentences are subject to . 
Objectivist theories seem to imply misleadingly that just as it is 
relatively simple to discover the truth value of simple descriptive 
sentences, such as 'the cat is on the mat', so is it relatively simple to 
determine the truth value of judgements about artistic value, such as 
the statement 'Picasso's Guernica is a good work of art'. 
Such an interpretation of aesthetic judgement is quite mistaken, 
however, for it gives an erroneous impression of the simplicity of 
artistic value. Artistic value does not happily conform to an 
interpretation in terms of a narrow either/ or bivalent logic. The task 
of determining the value of art is complicated by a number of factors . 
Not only are there many different facets to the value of art 
(demarcated in this thesis by the various different Junctions of art), 
but there are also many levels of value. The contribution which the 
performance of a particular function makes to the value of a work of 
art is a matter of degree. It may be a significant component of artistic 
value, or it may make little impact. (It may of course even detract 
from the value of a work of art.) Another consideration which 
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complicates aesthetic judgement is that there are certain 
dimensions of artistic value which are particularly prone to 
conflicting assessment. 7 Works of art are at once far more ambiguous 
and provocative than straightforward descriptive sentences, and will 
resist any narrow framework of interpretation. Their meaning is not 
nearly so transparent. 
Another reason for resisting the idea that judgements about art 
are subject to the same kind of bivalent logical interpretation as 
simple descriptive sentences, is that such an interpretation 
encourages a misconception of the purpose of the evaluation of art. 
The idea that the evaluation of art is a matter which can be cut and 
dried, as the objectivist supposes, suggests that the purpose of 
evaluation is to come up with some kind of objectively correct 
verdict about the value of an art work. I believe that such a 
conception is unnecessarily limited, and makes for a narrow, static 
and inflexible account of the purpose of assessment. What I propose 
in this thesis, is that we should view evaluation as a process in which 
we acknowledge the multi-faceted nature of art, and encourage an 
assessment which draws attention to the variety of ways in which we 
can appreciate a work of art, in terms of the various aesthetic and 
non-aesthetic functions which works of art can be seen to perform. 
Such an interpretation acknowledges that there is a diversity of 
perspectives from which we can evaluate art, and that different 
people will legitimately derive different interpretations of the value 
of the same works, by privileging different artistic functions or 
criteria. 
Context and Evaluation 
In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein claims that in order 
to fully understand the meaning of a word, we must understand its 
7. I refer in particular to the 'aesthetic dimension' of art. Although there is some room 
for disagreement over the value of the non-aesthetic functions of art. we can usually 
come to a reasonable level of agreement as to how well an art work expresses a 
particular emotion or expresses a particular cultural value. It is the aesthetic value of 
a work of art which admits the most scope for subjective disagreement. 
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use. What is meant here is that if we are to understand a word's 
meaning. we must look beyond the word itself (and its immediate 
referent). and focus on the various contexts in which that word is 
used in language (Wittgenstein. 1958, paragraph 43). The meaning of 
a word is thus importantly determined by the uses to which it 
happens to be put in the public and communal world of language and 
communication. In an important sense, the meaning of a word is 
determined by factors which are external, and set up 
intersubjectively by a community of language users. In a similar way. 
the meaning of a work of art can also be importantly dependent upon 
conventions and beliefs which are essentially public. and external to 
the work itself. The full meaning of Patricia Grace's novel Potiki, for 
example, can only be understood in the context of the beliefs and 
values which constitute the Maori world-view. And to provide an 
example from the graphic arts. the full meaning of Hieronymous 
Bosch's The Garden of Delights can only be understood in the 
context of the fearful Christian ontology of fifteenth century Europe. 
The extent to which the 'meaning' or 'identity' of an art work is 
dependent upon factors external to the work itself becomes evident 
when we examine the language with which we describe art. A great 
many of the words with which we commonly describe works of art. 
while grammatically predicates. are logically relations. 8 In order 
explain how such words are predicable of art works. we must 
'unpack' the meaning of the word. so that we can identify the 
relations that are being implied to hold between the art work itself 
and various aspects of its environment. The words with which we 
describe art relate art works to many diverse aspects of the external 
world. When we call an art work original, for example. we do not 
mean that that work is original 'in itself. We are rather asserting that 
that work. in relation to other art works. is in some respect 
innovative or new. Or when we call a performance in a play 
convincing, we are likely to be claiming that it is convincing in virtue 
of the degree to which it accurately reflects the realities of human 
relations, or accurately portrays some human character trait, such as 
jealousy or forgiveness. And when we call an art work moving. joyful, 
8. I owe this point to John Patterson. my supervisor. 
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or frightening, we are tacitly making a reference to the 
characteristic effect that that work has on its observer. In this 
respect the meaning of the evaluative word can be related directly to 
the 'perlocutionary' effect that the work has on its audience. 9 
It is clear that the evaluation of art is a heavily context 
dependent activity. Much evaluative language implicitly relates art 
works to external features in a variety of ways. And as we have seen, 
the value which we bestow on an art work is determined by such 
contextual factors as the degree to which we are moved emotionally 
by the work, the effectiveness of the work's portrayal of the values 
and concerns with which we identify as social beings, and the degree 
to which an art work promotes intellectual stimulation. 
An important implication of the relation between evaluation and 
context is that particular evaluations, to the extent that they relate 
art works to external features, will be highly contextualized, and will 
exhibit a dependency on the particular contextual environments in 
which they are made. If we consider a particular work to be a good 
work, for example, on account of its bitingly satirical portrayal of an 
unpopular person or attitude, and we then take this work and give it 
to a critic in Tokyo, who is unaware of the of the localized satirical 
significance of the work, it will be highly unlikely that this work will 
continue to be rated as favourably in its new environment. (It is of 
course possible that the work will come to be admired on account of 
some entirely different feature.) In a similar way, it would not be 
possible for a person who is completely ignorant of Aboriginal culture 
and values to understand the full meaning and significance of 
Aboriginal graphic art. It is important that we realize that the 
evaluation of art works can be bound in this way to a certain place or 
time. Correspondingly, the criteria with which we evaluate an art 
work will vary over time, and also from community to community. 
9. In How to Do Things with Words, J. L. Austin refers to the effect that a word has on 
its audience (such as to cause embarrassment) as its 'perlocutionary force'. In a 
similar way, the effect that a work of art has upon its audience (such as to evoke 
sorrow or to make us laugh) can be thought of as the perlocutionary force of that work 
of art. 
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If we wish to access the full potential of a work of art, it is clear 
that we must be prepared to examine the work from a broad 
perspective, taking into consideration the relations which obtain 
between the work itself and various aspects of the wider 'context' in 
which it appears. A significant implication of the dependence of the 
meaning and value of art on contextual factors is that the aesthete's 
idea that we could evaluate art works by focussing exclusively on the 
internal features of the art work itself comes to look less and less 
plausible. 
Art and Value 
As we have seen, the values which we attach to art are dependent in 
part upon contextual factors which are external to art works 
themselves. That this is so indicates that the value of a work of art is 
not determined solely by internal features. In this section I wish to 
tum more directly to the issue of aesthetic value, and argue that we 
do indeed have reason to resist the idea that the values which attach 
to art works derive entirely from the works themselves. As an 
introduction to this discussion, I believe that it is profitable to test 
our intuitions regarding the nature of artistic value by conducting a 
thought experiment based upon the well known 'last person' 
example often cited in environmental philosophy. 10 
In the ordinarily construed 'last person' example, we are 
encouraged to imagine a world in which there is only one person 
remaining. How would we feel, we are asked, if this last person began 
to destroy shrubs and trees, pollute rivers, and generally abuse the 
environment? If our intuitions tell us that such behaviour is simply 
unacceptable, and that the last person has no right to damage the 
environment in such a disrespectful manner, we can supposedly 
conclude, if our intuitions are correct, that trees and rivers actually 
have value in themselves. In other words, we can suppose that the 
value of the natural environment is not contingent upon there being a 
10. See Mannison, Routley, and McRobbie (eds.) Environmental Philosophy, pp. 121-
123. 
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class of valuers. Even if there were no people left to value it, the 
natural environment would continue to have value in itself. The last 
person, in destroying a plant or polluting a river, would be damaging 
the integrity and undermining the value of something which is 
intrinsically valuable. Given that the natural environment is indeed 
valuable in itself, as the thought experiment suggests, we can assume 
that it would be morally wrong for the last person to consider the 
environment as simply there for the plundering. The natural 
environment should rather be conceived of as being intrinsically 
valuable, and be respected and protected, even by the last person 
alive on Earth. 
Having explained how the last person experiment is presented 
in the literature on environmental philosophy, and outlined the 
conclusion which we are expected to draw from this thought 
experiment (namely that the natural environment has intrinsic value, 
and thus should be respected and protected). it is now time to 
perform our own thought experiment. What happens when we 
substitute works of art for plants and trees in the last person 
experiment? Imagine a second scenario, in which the last person left 
on earth walks through the front door of Wellington's City Art 
Gallery, and proceeds to wantonly smash and destroy every sculpture 
and painting in the gallery. What do our intuitions tell us about the 
value of works of art in this thought experiment? Funnily enough, my 
intuition here is that it somehow would not matter if the last person 
left on earth destroyed works of art for pleasure. For if there is only 
one person left on earth, and this person has no regard or respect 
for works of art, then what difference does it make if remaining art 
works are destroyed? Since it makes no difference to the art work 
itself if it is destroyed, and since art works make no significant 
contribution to the environment at large, it would seem implausible 
to assert that art works continue to have any value at all when there 
is nobody left to appreciate them. 
What is suggested by such a response to the destruction of art 
works by the last person is that art works do not derive their value 
from any intrinsic or internal merit-conferring properties or 
qualities. They rather derive their value by being valued by a class of 
valuers who admire and appreciate their various features. Art works 
15 
are valuable because we value them. We value them on account of the 
various ways in which they can provide stimulation, 'enlightenment', 
pleasure, and understanding. (Hence the appropriateness of a 
functionalist account of evaluation.) If my intuition about the value of 
art is correct, and it is indeed the case that works of art do not have 
value 'in themselves', then it makes no sense to invoke any 
metaphysical account of value in terms of the kind of objective 
intrinsic value often talked about by realist philosophers. 11 
In denying that art works have objective intrinsic value, I am 
denying that they have intrinsic value in the sense that they possess 
qualities which would guarantee a favourable assessment by anybody 
with the 'capacity' or 'intuition' to realize their 'true worth'. The value 
of an art work is not somehow fixed or built in to the work itself, 
existing all along for us to find out. It is not the case that works of art 
possess some kind of in-built core of value which ought to be intuited 
by any attentive observer, from any cultural or artistic background. As 
I have stressed already, an art work is good because it possesses 
features which we happen to hold to be valuable, not because it 
possesses features which are valuable 'in themselves', independent of 
human judgement. That this is so, however, does not force a radical 
'anything goes' subjectivism, where any judgement is held to be as 
good as any other. 
Although I wish to assert that works of art do not possess 
properties which are intrinsically merit-conferring, in the sense that 
these properties generate an aesthetic ought, and as it were demand 
an honorific assessment, it is not contradictory to hold that the value 
of an art work is objective in the sense that we value it on account of 
features exhibited by the work itself, and not just on account of our 
own subjective experience of the work. When we judge that a play by 
Shakespeare is an excellent work of art, for example, we can give as 
our reason for esteeming its value the shrewd and masterful 
characterization, or the eloquent and witty dialogue, say. The 
'goodness' of Shakespeare's play can be seen to be objective insofar as 
our reason for valuing the work stems from the good-making features 
11. See for example the value theory articulated by Richard Sylvan in On The Value 
Core of Deep-Green Theory. 
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of the work itself (the features on account of which we value it). The 
goodness of the play is not objective, however, in the sense that the 
features on account of which we value it ought to guarantee an 
honorific assessment. On the contrary, the way is fully open for 
somebody else to come along and find the work to be objectionable 
on account of these very same features. What we would expect, 
however, is that when someone wishes to contradict our judgement 
that a particular characterization or portrayal is especially good, they 
would be prepared to somehow justify or defend their opposing 
evaluation. 
To reiterate, a work of art is objectively valuable only in the 
sense that it possesses certain features which we hold to be valuable. 
It may exhibit, for example, a subtle and shrewd insight into human 
psychology, or a strikingly beautiful representation of a familiar 
landscape. These features are only valuable, however, because we 
value them. In the absence of a class of valuers, they cease to have 
artistic value at all. To give an illustration of another class of entities 
whose value is contingent upon a class of valuers, consider 
medicines. Medicine, like art, only has value with respect to a class 
of people who benefit from its effects. Although the value of a medical 
drug is objective in the sense that its healing qualities derive from 
the chemical constitution of the drug itself, we needn't claim that 
the drug has intrinsic value. Although the chemical constitution of an 
asthma drug would remain unchanged, and a Shakespearian play 
would retain its subtle characterization and shrewd insights into 
human behaviour, neither of these entities could be said to remain 
valuable in the absence of a class of valuers. Evaluation is to be 
construed as an inescapably human activity. We value art works on 
account of the things that they do. 
The aim of a functionalist account of evaluation is to specify the 
various ways in which art can have value to its audience. The 
following quote from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, 
although referring to the division of words into kinds, captures the 
essential flavour of the 'functionalist' account of the assessment of art 
presented in this thesis. 
how we group words into kinds will depend on the aim of 
classification, and on our own inclination. (Wittgenstein, 
1958, paragraph 17) 
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In summary, the purpose of this thesis is to present a 
'functionalist' interpretation of the assessment of art. As I have 
explained in this chapter, a functionalist framework of evaluation 
concentrates upon the various aesthetic and non-aesthetic functions 
which we perceive art works to be performing, in virtue of which we 
award artistic merit. 
In the following chapters I shall outline what I see to be six 
important functions of art, and discuss how the performance of each 
of these functions can contribute to the value of an art work. In 
chapter two, I will discuss the concept of representation, according 
to which it is a defining function of art to represent or depict 
features of the world around us. Although I will not agree entirely 
with the presuppositions that often underlie the concept of 
representation, I will show that the presentation in art of familiar 
aspects of the world and of aspects of human experience can indeed 
be an important function of artistic value. In chapter three, I shall 
concentrate upon the way in which the reflection of cultural and 
spiritual beliefs and values can contribute to the value of a work of 
art. In chapter four, I will concentrate on the way in which art can 
function to reflect and express social and political insights and 
concerns. In chapter five, I will focus on the way in which art can be 
the vehicle for the presentation of ideas and situations of moral 
significance. and in chapter six, I will illustrate how the expression 
of emotion can contribute to the value of art. Finally, in chapter 
seven, I shall demonstrate how the capacity to provide aesthetic 
stimulation is a central dimension of the value of a work of art. 
